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Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether subjects tend to meet the
expectations of others (the guilt aversion hypothesis). The specificity of our ap-
proach is that second-order beliefs are manipulated exogenously just by chang-
ing the parameters of the experimental game. In particular, we consider a simple
communication game where the sender is perfectly informed about his material
benefit from lying to the receiver. At the same time, the receiver knows only the
ex-ante distribution of the sender’s material incentives. By changing this distri-
bution between the experimental treatments, we achieve an exogenous variation
in the receiver’s payoff expectations (and hence in the corresponding sender’s
second-order beliefs) while keeping the sender’s actual material incentives fixed.
The results show that the rate of lying is significantly lower when the receiver is
supposed to have higher payoff expectations, however only in the case when the
monetary incentives for lying are fixed at a moderate level.
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1. Introduction
A vast economic literature suggests that people care not only about the ma-
terial consequences of their actions, but also about others’ beliefs (Geanakoplos
et al., 1989; Dana et al., 2007; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Considerable
attention in this field was given to the study of guilt aversion, i.e., an aversion
to disappointing others’ expectations, which has been shown to have important
theoretical implications for strategic behavior (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007,
2009).
However, the experimental evidence on guilt aversion is somewhat mixed,
being subject to specific methodological problems. Indeed, guilt aversion im-
plies that individual behavior is affected by second-order beliefs, i.e., beliefs
about others’ beliefs. At the same time, these beliefs may be endogenous with
respect to one’s own behavior, i.e., they may simply follow behavior because
subjects believe that others can predict it well (Vanberg, 2008, p. 1469). On
the one hand, this limits the possibility to test guilt aversion by simply eliciting
intrinsic second-order beliefs of subjects and then establishing their correlation
with prosocial behavior.1 In particular, if subjects tend to believe that the av-
erage behavior is close to their own (the false consensus effect, see Ross et al.,
1977), then they might think that the average expectations are also in line with
their own actions. This might cause a correlation between second-order beliefs
and behavior independently of guilt aversion.2
On the other hand, the close link between beliefs and behavior makes it dif-
ficult to design an exogenous treatment which does not directly affect behavior,
yet significantly shifts second-order beliefs (so that their truly causal effect on
behavior can then be traced). Previous studies have proposed different ways to
achieve this goal, such as manipulating pre-play communication (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; Beck et al., 2013), changing game framing (Dufwenberg et
al., 2011), or rescaling of beliefs measurement (Ockenfels and Werner, 2014).
However, one might argue that in some of these approaches the manipulated
exogenous factor could still cause an additional (potentially interfering) effect
on behavior not related to belief-dependent preferences. In particular, Charness
and Dufwenberg (2006) used the availability of pre-play communication (specif-
ically, promises) as an instrument to increase first- and second-order beliefs in
1Such correlation was found to be highly significant in many studies, including Dufwenberg
and Gneezy (2000), Guerra and Zizzo (2004), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Bacharach et
al. (2007), Attanasi et al. (2014).
2Empirical evidence for this effect was found in Bellemare et al. (2011), Engelmann and
Strobel (2012) and Khalmetski et al. (2015).
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a trust game. Their treatment with communication was indeed characterized by
both higher beliefs and more trustworthy behavior.3 However, the communi-
cation might have a parallel effect on trustees’ behavior which is driven by a
preference for promise keeping per se. This might complicate the estimation
of the effect of guilt aversion since the two effects potentially go in the same
direction (see Vanberg, 2008, for a discussion).4
The most straightforward approach to exogenously induce second-order be-
liefs was implemented by Ellingsen et al. (2010) who simply disclosed first-order
beliefs of the matched opponents in the trust and dictator games. They found no
evidence that second-order beliefs induced in this way affect behavior.5 Yet,
this method has several limitations. First, disclosing individual beliefs of oth-
ers might signal additional information (besides beliefs per se), such as personal
traits or social norms, which might also trigger interfering effects (see Khalmet-
ski et al., 2015, for a discussion). Second, from the methodological point of
view, since others’ beliefs are rarely precisely observable in practice, it is also
important to study whether presumably different first-order beliefs of the oppo-
nent trigger different behavioral responses, which is the approach used in this
paper.
In our experiment, second-order beliefs of a subject are manipulated in a
direct way just by varying the ex-ante (incomplete) information of his oppo-
nent about the game (reflecting its actual stochastic structure), whereas the sub-
ject himself remains perfectly informed about the realized game parameters.
Hence, the experimental treatment specifically targets second-order beliefs with-
out changing any other aspect of the subject’s decision situation (once the param-
eter realization is fixed), which is the main advantage of the approach. Specifi-
cally, we use a simple communication game, where the sender’s material incen-
3The positive effect of the option to make promises on trustworthy behavior was replicated
by Ben-Ner et al. (2011), Servátka et al. (2011) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2011), among
others.
4Vanberg (2008) proposed a method to circumvent this problem by rematching subjects after
the communication phase in a dictator game (without informing the recipient whether she has
been rematched), to test whether the mere fact that the recipient has been given a promise (from
another dictator) affects giving of the lastly matched dictator. Vanberg (2008) found no effect of
higher (promise-induced) expectations on giving. However, Kawagoe and Narita (2014) argued
that the effect of guilt aversion in this experiment could be affected by the rematching of subjects,
which might cause countervailing effects similar to the diffusion of responsibility.
5Oppositely, Reuben et al. (2009) and Bellemare et al. (2014) observed a significantly posi-
tive correlation between prosocial behavior and disclosed payoff expectations of the opponent.
Khalmetski et al. (2015) replicated the setting of Ellingsen et al. (2010) with the strategy method,
finding clear evidence for belief-dependent preferences at the within-subject level.
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tives to lie are private information of the sender, while the receiver knows only
the ex-ante distribution of these incentives. By varying this distribution between
the treatments, we exogenously manipulate the receiver’s first- and hence the
sender’s second-order beliefs. At the same time, since the sender is perfectly
informed about his actually realized incentives, they can be independently con-
trolled for. Thus, we obtain an exogenous variation in the second-order beliefs
for given monetary incentives, which allows us to study the causal effect of these
beliefs on behavior (not affected by other effects of the experimental manipula-
tion).6
Our results reveal a significant effect of second-order beliefs on the rate of
lying in one of the material games. Generally, this provides a clear evidence for
guilt aversion, strengthening the previous positive findings (inter alia, supporting
the expectation-based explanation of the significant treatment effect in Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006). At the same time, we find an additional interaction
effect of monetary incentives with guilt aversion. In particular, second-order be-
liefs do not significantly affect senders’ behavior under high monetary incentives
for lying. As we elaborate in the discussion section, this suggests that subjects
might feel pressure to live up not to any expectations of others, but only to those
which appear substantiated from their perspective.
The closest paper to ours is that by Ederer and Stremitzer (2015). They also
exogenously manipulated first- and second-order beliefs in a variant of the trust
game by changing the trustor’s ex-ante information about the likely action set
of the trustee (instead of changing the ex-ante knowledge about the opponent’s
incentives as in our paper). Besides, the trustee was given an opportunity to send
a free-form message to the trustor at the beginning of the game. They found a
significant effect of higher (induced) second-order beliefs on behavior at least
for those trustees who have given a promise to the trustor, which is in line with
our results. At the same time, there are important differences. First, Ederer and
Stremitzer (2015) hypothesized that a decision maker cares about expectations
of another player if and only if these expectations are supported by the decision
maker’s own promise to this player. Yet, our results demonstrate that the exis-
tence of a promise is not a necessary condition for guilt-averse behavior since in
our experiment there is no option to send promises (apart from a prefabricated
6Gneezy (2005) also uses a design where the sender is privately informed about his incentives
(while Battigalli et al., 2013, analyze his results in the context of guilt aversion). However, he
does not vary the ex-ante distribution of incentives, which drives the treatment effect in our
experiment. Costa-Gomes et al. (2014) also use an exogenous shift in payoffs to instrument
expectations, yet to study the effect of first-order beliefs on behavior.
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message about the numerical state of the world).7 Second, Ederer and Stremitzer
(2015) studied the impact of second-order beliefs for a single realization of the
material subgame (namely, the extended action set). In contrast, our analysis
involves all data obtained by variation of second-order beliefs against realized
material incentives (in an effectively 2 × 2 experimental design). Hence, we
were able to study not only the effect of second-order beliefs on behavior for
given material incentives, but also the impact of the level of material incentives
on the magnitude of this effect. As a result, we found a clear asymmetry of guilt
aversion depending on the size of material incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
experimental design, procedures and hypotheses. Section 3 shows the results.
Section 4 discusses the observed interaction between guilt aversion and monetary
incentives. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. Experimental design
The main idea of the design is to measure the effect of (exogenously manipu-
lated) second-order beliefs on a subject’s propensity to behave prosocially while
fixing his monetary incentives. This is achieved with an experimental sender-
receiver game where the ex-ante distribution of the sender’s material incentives
(which shapes the receiver’s first- and the sender’s second-order beliefs) is varied
against the actual realization of these incentives (privately known to the sender).
2.1. Experimental games
We consider two different experimental games between a sender (he) and
a receiver (she): the Low Incentive Game (LIG) and the High Incentive Game
(HIG). The timing of both games is the same and unfolds as follows:
1. Nature determines a natural number x between 1 and 100, randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution (the ‘secret’ number).
2. The sender gets privately informed about the secret number and sends a
message to the receiver about it (of the form ‘The secret number is m’,
where m is a natural number between 1 and 100).
3. The receiver makes a guess g between 1 and 100 about the secret number
and the payoffs are realized.
7Ederer and Stremitzer (2015) did not find evidence for guilt aversion for the case when the
trustee has decided not to give a promise to the trustor at the beginning of the game. However,
as they discuss themselves, this could be due to the selection effect.
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Low Incentive Game (LIG) :
Sender’s payoff Receiver’s payoff
Correct guess (g = x) 10 10
Incorrect guess (g 6= x) 11 2
High Incentive Game (HIG):
Sender’s payoff Receiver’s payoff
Correct guess (g = x) 7 10
Incorrect guess (g 6= x) 10 2
Fig. 1. Payoff matrices of the experimental games.
Table 1. Percentage distribution of the material games in each treatment.
Low Expectations High Expectations
Treatment (LET) Treatment (HET)
Low Incentive Game (LIG) 25% 75%
High Incentive Game (HIG) 75% 25%
The payoff structure, which distinguishes the games from each other, is de-
termined by whether the receiver’s guess is correct (see Fig. 1). In both games
the sender has a strict incentive to induce a wrong guess of the receiver.
2.2. Experimental treatments
Based on the games described above, we construct two experimental treat-
ments: the Low Expectations Treatment (LET) and the High Expectations Treat-
ment (HET).8 In both treatments, prior to the game, nature randomly chooses
whether the LIG or the HIG is actually played, with probabilities specific for
each treatment (see Table 1).
Importantly, in each treatment the sender is immediately informed whether
the HIG or the LIG has been realized (after he learns the treatment), while the
receiver knows only the ex-ante probabilities of each material game. This infor-
mation structure of the players is made common knowledge.
2.3. Experimental procedures
In each experimental session half of the subjects were randomly assigned the
role of the sender, and the others the role of the receiver. The experiment was
8The term ‘Expectations’ refers to the receiver’s ex-ante payoff expectations, as will be clar-
ified below in Section 2.4.
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played for 8 rounds, while in each round every sender was randomly matched
with a receiver. It was ensured that no pair of participants was matched together
more than once. We used a within-subject design so that each subject played both
treatments during the experiment. To make the order of treatments completely
symmetric, the treatments alternated each round (in half of the sessions starting
with the LET, in the other half of the sessions starting with the HET).9 The LIG
was played in 25% of the cases in the LET, and in 75% of the cases in the HET.10
After each round, the players learned their own payoff and the payoff of their
opponent. Additionally, the receiver was shown the actual secret number and the
sender’s incentive structure (the LIG or the HIG) which had been realized in the
round. At the end of the experiment, two randomly selected rounds were paid
(each game point corresponded to 0.5 Euro).
We elicited both the first-order beliefs of receivers and the second-order be-
liefs of senders in each treatment.11 The first-order beliefs were elicited by ask-
ing how many senders are believed to tell the truth in the current round (where
a particular treatment was played). In providing the second-order beliefs, each
sender had to guess the first-order belief of his matched receiver. The correct
9The repeated setting was needed to collect enough observations for each sender (in particu-
lar, at least one observation for each possible treatment-game combination). At the same time,
the within-subject design allowed us to increase statistical power of the analysis in the presence
of high heterogeneity of belief-dependent preferences, observed by Bellemare et al. (2014) and
Khalmetski et al. (2015), among others. In particular, Khalmetski et al. (2015) established that
since subjects might react both positively and negatively to an increase in second-order beliefs
(depending on whether they care more about disappointing or exceeding others’ expectations),
the statistical power of between-subject tests can be undermined to the extent that no evidence
for belief-dependent preferences can be revealed. Hence, the implementation of a within-subject
design might be considered as a way to effectively reduce the noise stemming from individual
heterogeneity, in spite of some limitations of the approach like potentially higher demand effects
(see Charness et al., 2012, for a discussion).
10These frequencies were implemented at the individual sender’s level (so that the actually
realized frequencies for a given receiver were stochastic due to random rematching). Specifically,
both senders and receivers were told (at the beginning of each round) that the probability that the
computer chooses the LIG (HIG) in the current round is 3/4 (in the HET (LET)). After that, only
the sender was shown the actually realized game.
11The beliefs were elicited just once for each treatment (at the beginning of the first round of
each treatment, right after the treatment has been announced) to minimize the focus of senders
on the second-order beliefs, which might arise through merely answering elicitation questions.
Besides, eliciting beliefs several times in exactly the same setting may trigger an experimenter
demand effect for their update between the rounds. The bonus for a correct belief was paid
independently from which round had been chosen for payment, and the information on whether
a subject has earned the bonus was revealed only at the end of the experiment. This allowed us
not to distort the expected payoff towards the rounds with belief elicitation questions.
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guesses of both senders and receivers were rewarded with an additional bonus of
5 Euro. The translated instructions can be found in Appendix B.
2.4. Experimental hypotheses
Let us first consider our experimental games (the LIG and the HIG). Two
main features of the games can be immediately recognized. First, the receiver is
likely to follow the sender’s message in both games since, otherwise, her chance
to guess correctly at random is minimal (at most 1/99).12 Second, in the HIG
the sender has relatively higher monetary incentives to induce a wrong receiver’s
guess, and hence to lie. As a result, we can plausibly assume that the likelihood
of lying should be higher in the HIG.13
Hypothesis 1. The rate of lying is higher in the HIG than in the LIG.
Next, consider our experimental treatments (the LET and the HET). Since the
HIG with a higher expected rate of lying is more likely to be realized in the LET
than in the HET, one could presume that receivers should have lower ex-ante
payoff expectations in the LET (which motivates the labeling of the treatments).
Senders, anticipating this, should correspondingly have lower second-order be-
liefs regarding these receivers’ expectations in this treatment.
Hypothesis 2. Receivers’ first- and senders’ second-order beliefs are lower in
the LET than in the HET.
Now notice that the information structure of the game allows us to vary
senders’ second-order beliefs (between the treatments) while keeping their actual
material incentives fixed at a certain level (determined by the realized game). For
example, let us select the ex-post realizations of a single game (either the LIG
or the HIG) in both experimental treatments, i.e., the observations corresponding
to a specific row of Table 1. Since senders are always perfectly informed about
their realized monetary incentives, the latter do not vary between the treatments
in this case. Yet, since receivers’ payoff expectations are only determined by
12In particular, the receiver should follow the sender’s message if she expects that the rate of
truth-telling is at least 1%, which is obtained from the following condition (with α denoting the
expected rate of truth-telling): Pr[g = x|Follow]≥ Pr[g = x|Not Follow]⇔ α ≥ 1/99(1−α)⇔
α ≥ 0.01.
13See, e.g., Gneezy (2005) for evidence that the rate of lying in sender-receiver games in-
creases with the relative monetary gain from a lie.
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the treatment (as they do not obtain more precise information ex-ante), these ex-
pectations are supposed to be higher in the HET, as well as the corresponding
senders’ second-order beliefs (according to Hypothesis 2). Consequently, if a
sender is guilt-averse (in the sense of having disutility from falling below the
expectations of his receiver), then it should be more costly for him to lie in the
HET. In contrast, if the sender cares only about material outcomes, then his be-
havior should stay the same over the treatments once the realized game (the LIG
or the HIG) is fixed, as the latter uniquely determines the payoff structure of both
players (perfectly known to the sender).14 This leads to our main experimental
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a (Guilt aversion). Conditional on given material incentives (the
LIG or the HIG), the rate of lying is lower in the HET than in the LET.
Hypothesis 3b (Pure outcome-based preferences). Conditional on given ma-
terial incentives (the LIG or the HIG), the rate of lying is the same in both treat-
ments.
Note that the experimental design allows us to separate the effect of guilt
aversion from the effects of other possible preferences, such as, e.g, image con-
cerns or distributional preferences. In particular, models of social image (e.g.,
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Tadelis, 2011) as-
sume that a subject cares about the ex-post inferences of others regarding his
social preferences (or “type”). At the same time, lying in the LIG might signal
lower social preferences than that in the HIG. Because of that, lying in the HET
(where the LIG is more likely) can cause higher image loss (or “shame”) than in
the LET if the receiver never knows the actually realized game. To avoid effects
on behavior from this side, the receiver was immediately informed whether the
LIG or the HIG had been played after the payoffs were realized, so that her ex-
post inferences about the sender, once the material game is fixed, were supposed
to be independent of the treatment (being determined solely by the game).
Besides, distributional preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) can also affect the propensity to lie
in a given experimental game. For example, in the HIG the sender obtains an
additional incentive to lie if he dislikes (disadvantageous) inequity which arises
in the case of truth-telling in this game. Yet, the exact structure of outcome-based
14Analogously, the sender should not change his behavior between the treatments if he is
driven by a belief-independent cost of lying, as modeled by, e.g., Kartik (2009).
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incentives affecting lying in a given experimental game does not matter for our
identification strategy: the only initial condition that needs to be satisfied is that
the rate of lying is higher in the HIG (Hypothesis 1), which is well confirmed
by our subsequent data. Eventually, this allows us to exogenously shift second-
order beliefs (by varying the ex-ante distribution of material incentives) while
keeping the realized material game fixed. As a result, the treatment effect cannot
be explained by outcome-based concerns, which then remain constant between
the treatments. Thus, observing a significant treatment effect in at least one of
the material games might be considered as clear evidence for belief-dependent
preferences.15
3. Results
The experiment was conducted with 242 participants divided into 8 sessions
in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research in July-August 2013.16 The
experiment was computerized with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and
subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The average earning was
near 11 Euro (including a show-up fee of 2.5. Euro), while the experiment lasted
for around 45 minutes.
In line with Hypothesis 1, senders significantly reacted to the variation in the
material incentives: the rate of lying was 69.6% in the HIG versus 34.7% in the
LIG (see Fig. 2(a); p < 0.001).17 Accordingly, the rate of lying was higher in
the LET, where the HIG was played with a higher probability: 63.8% in the LET
compared to 40.5% in the HET (Fig. 2(b); p < 0.001). Note that for now we
cannot tell whether the difference in the lying rate between the LET and the HET
was affected by guilt aversion, since this difference could potentially be driven
solely by the higher frequency of the HIG in the LET.
15We do not postulate any ex-ante hypotheses regarding the interaction between the treat-
ment effect and material incentives, i.e., whether the behavioral effect of an exogenous shift in
second-order beliefs should differ between the LIG and the HIG. At the same time, an ex-post
explanation is suggested in Section 4.
16There were 2 sessions with 28 subjects, 3 sessions with 30 subjects and 3 sessions with 32
subjects.
17To test statistical hypotheses, we obtained one pair of observations for each sender by aver-
aging his lying rate across periods in each treatment (to test the change between the treatments)
or in each game (to test the change between the games). After that, we applied a Wilcoxon
signed ranks test to the paired data. For robustness, we also tested the main hypotheses when the
data is aggregated at the session level (confirming all results at the subject level), to control for
interdependence of observations which could potentially arise from the end-of-round feedback
provision (see Table A.1 in Appendix A).
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a) The change in the lying rate b) The change in the lying rate
between the games. between the treatments.
Fig. 2. The change in the lying rate between the games and treatments.
Also, in line with our predictions, receivers mostly followed the sender’s
message in both treatments (i.e., set their guess equal to the obtained message).
In particular, they followed in 86.6% of the cases in the LET, and in 92.4%
of the cases in the HET (yet, the difference is statistically significant). Note
that senders could partially learn receivers’ behavior throughout the experiment
by observing the realized payoffs after telling the truth, which then indicated
whether the receiver had followed the message.18 However, the difference in the
following rates between the treatments was unlikely to noticeably affect senders’
behavior. First, the expected monetary payoffs were almost not altered by such
a small difference.19 Second, the results stay qualitatively the same if we leave
only those senders who never observed that the receiver had not follow their
message (who were 74% of all senders).20
The variation in the lying rate between the treatments was reflected in both
18After sending a false message, the sender was able to infer whether the receiver had followed
the message from her payoff only if the receiver still guessed correctly. Yet, this happened only
in one instance.
19In particular, the average sender’s payoff from lying did not vary between the treatments
(since in this case senders always got their highest payoff except for one single observation),
while truth-telling yielded a higher average sender’s payoff in the LET for both incentive struc-
tures: 11 cents more in the LIG, and 5 cents more in the HIG (due to the lower likelihood of
following in the LET). Thus, even if this would affect the sender’s incentives, the effect should
go in the opposite direction to our predictions (more truth-telling in the LET). Besides, the fol-
lowing rates in both treatments were well above 1%, which is the threshold below which a sender
willing to induce a correct guess should lie instead of telling the truth (so that the receiver has at
least a very small chance to guess correctly).
20Receivers could also learn senders’ behavior throughout the experiment, since they were
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Table 2. The effect of the treatment on the average beliefs.
Actual rate of truth- Receivers’ first-order Senders’ second-order
telling, % beliefs, % beliefs, %
LET 36.2 46.1 36.2
HET 59.5 67.3 56.7
The beliefs are reported in terms of the expected rate of truth-telling (for
receivers) and the expected first-order belief of the opponent (for senders).
receivers’ first-order beliefs and senders’ second-order beliefs, which were much
lower in the LET in line with Hypothesis 2 (Table 2). While the magnitude of
the actual change in the rate of truth-telling between the treatments (23.3%) was
well predicted by both receivers and senders (21.2% and 20.5%, respectively),
the receivers were more optimistic than senders in predicting the levels of truth-
telling, overpredicting the actual rates by nearly 10% in each treatment. At the
same time, senders’ second-order beliefs were very consistent with their own
behavior (virtually coinciding in the LET).21 Most importantly, as in the case
of the lying rate, the difference in both receivers’ and senders’ beliefs between
the treatments is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). Thus, the treatment
variation created a purely exogenous shift in the second-order beliefs of senders,
which allows room for the potential effect of guilt aversion we aim to test.
Let us finally look at whether the treatment had an effect on the lying rate
conditional on given monetary incentives (the LIG or the HIG), which would be
an indication of guilt aversion according to Hypothesis 3a. The results are given
in Fig. 3. There is a clear effect in the LIG, where the rate of lying dropped
from 44.6% in the LET to 31.4% in the HET (p = 0.004). However, in the
HIG the effect is statistically insignificant (70.2% in the LET and 67.8% in the
HET; p = 0.936).22 Hence, Hypothesis 3b (pure outcome-based preferences) is
rejected in favor of Hypothesis 3a (guilt aversion) in the case of the LIG, however
it is not rejected for the HIG.23
While it is intuitive to relate the observed treatment effect to senders’ second-
order beliefs (which were the only aspect of the sender’s decision situation being
varied between the treatments in a given material game), our data provides addi-
shown the actual secret number after each round. However, this fact could not be of strategic
concern for senders as they could never face the same receiver twice during the experiment
(which was clearly stated in the instructions).
21Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject the hypothesis that the average sender’s second-
order belief is equal to the actual truth-telling rate in both treatments at any reasonable signifi-
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Fig. 3. The treatment effect conditional on monetary incentives.
tional evidence for this. In particular, guilt aversion would predict that the lying
rate should decrease in the HET only for those senders whose second-order be-
liefs were strictly higher in this treatment. The share of such senders was 67.8%
(while 13.2% did not change their beliefs over the treatments and 19.0% had
a higher belief in the LET). Taking only these senders with consistent second-
order beliefs, the treatment effect gets stronger in the LIG (where the lying rate
decreases from 41.5% in the LET to 22.8% in the HET; p = 0.002), however,
it is still insignificant in the HIG (69.9% in the LET and 64.6% in the HET;
p = 0.441) (Fig. 4). At the same time, senders with inconsistent second-order
beliefs virtually did not react to the treatment variation, with the change in the
lying rate between the treatments being −1.7% in the LIG and 3.4% in the HIG
(highly insignificant in both cases).
4. Discussion
Our results show that second-order beliefs affect truth-telling, but only when
monetary incentives to lie are moderate (in the LIG). Note that although the
absolute value of the monetary incentives for lying in the LIG may seem small,
it was still sufficient to generate a sizeable lying rate (34.7% on average), which
cance level.
22The results are corroborated by a panel regression analysis (see Table A.2 in Appendix A).
23Note that a nonnegligible share of subjects decreased their lying rate in the LET (10.7% of
subjects in the LIG and 13.2% of subjects in the HIG), in line with the preference for exceeding
expectations of others considered in Khalmetski et al. (2015).
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Fig. 4. The treatment effect for the senders with consistent second-order beliefs.
considerably varied between the treatments (by 13.2% for all subjects and by
18.7% for the subjects with consistent second-order beliefs).
However, we could not find a significant effect of second-order beliefs for
the case of higher monetary incentives, i.e., in the HIG. One explanation could
be that guilt aversion is a relatively subtle motivation, which is suppressed once
subjects get attracted by sizeable monetary incentives. An alternative explana-
tion might be related to the specific structure of players’ beliefs and material
incentives in the HIG if the HET is played (when the sender’s guilt aversion is
supposed to kick in): while the receiver’s expectations are high, they are incon-
sistent with the sender’s actually realized incentives to lie. This might provide a
self-excuse for the sender not to fulfill such “unsubstantiated” expectations and
to delegate the responsibility for letting down the receiver to nature’s choice of
incentives (unlucky for her). The fact that the receiver ex-post observes the actual
game being played should strengthen this effect since this justification becomes
addressed not only to the sender himself but also (implicitly) to the receiver. In
line with this hypothesis, our data reveal that senders tend to ignore the receiver’s
high expectations in this case.
In contrast, in the LIG, the receiver’s expectations in the HET are high while
the sender indeed has a low incentive to lie. Thus, the expectations reflect actual
sender’s incentives, which corresponds to a psychological equilibrium with con-
sistent beliefs typically considered in theoretical models of guilt aversion. The
predictions of these models are then supported by our data in this game: senders
lie significantly less in the HET/LIG case than in the LET/LIG case.24
24While the receiver’s expectations in the latter case can also be considered as inconsistent
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Overall, this suggests that guilt aversion might be affected by the ex-ante in-
formation asymmetry between players which could lead to different perceptions
of the appropriateness of expectations. Further research in this direction might
help to better understand this effect.
Finally, notice that one could implement a similar experimental setting using
a different game, e.g., a dictator or a trust game, which would allow us to in-
vestigate how the effect of guilt aversion depends on the context such as that of
communication or trust. This question is also left for future study.25
5. Conclusion
We suggest an experimental approach to test for guilt aversion in a simple
communication game. The design allowed us to induce a considerable shift in
second-order beliefs (while keeping the realized material game fixed) by varying
solely the ex-ante distribution of material incentives. The results show that the
rate of truth-telling is significantly affected by the induced expectations when the
monetary incentives for lying are moderate, in which case high expectations can
be rationalized from the sender’s informational perspective. Overall, our results
provide evidence for guilt aversion, at the same time motivating further research
to investigate its interaction with the way expectations are formed.
Appendix A. Additional statistical analysis
Table A.1 provides the results of non-parametric analysis when data is ag-
gregated at the session level. All results from the analysis at the subject level are
confirmed.
according to the reasoning above, senders’ ignorance of these expectations should have a smaller
effect on behavior than in the HET/HIG case since they are already low in the first place.
25Varying the timing of information in our experimental game provides additional opportuni-
ties for research. For example, one could change the design in that the exact information about
the sender’s incentives is revealed to the receiver after she learns the treatment (the LET or the
HET), but before the sender makes the choice. If the treatment still has an effect on senders’
behavior, this would suggest that the reference belief is the one in the initial game node rather
than in the game node directly preceding the choice.
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Table A.1. Non-parametric analysis at the session level.
Hypothesis Wilcoxon signed ranks test, p-value
LyingHIG =LyingLIG 0.012
LyingHET =LyingLET 0.012
LyingHET/LIG =LyingLET/LIG 0.017
LyingHET/HIG =LyingLET/HIG 0.483
FOBHET =FOBLET 0.012
SOBHET =SOBLET 0.012
Notation: FOB - (receiver’s) first-order belief, SOB - (sender’s) second-order belief.
The lower index denotes the treatment/game under consideration.
Table A.2 reports the results of the random-effects logit regression with the
lying rate as the dependent variable. The treatment effect is strong both in the
total sample (controlling for the monetary incentives) and in the LIG separately.
Table A.2. Determinants of the lying rate (random-effects logit estimates).
Full Sample LIG HIG
High Incentive Game 2.605∗∗∗
(0.261)
Low Expectations Treatment 0.701∗∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 0.264
(0.223) (0.342) (0.342)
Constant −1.501∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ 1.732∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.383) (0.461)
Observations 968 484 484
Number of subjects 121 121 121
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
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Appendix B. Experimental instructions
General instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
You are going to participate in an experiment where you can earn money.
Your payoff depends on your decisions, as well as on the decisions of other
participants. Please do not speak to other participants and do not look at their
monitors. If you have any questions, please raise your hand; one of our super-
visors will come to your place to address them. During the experiment you will
interact with other participants. The identity of other participants will remain
unknown to you, and your identity will remain unknown to them. These printed
instructions are the same for all participants.
Before the experiment begins, you will be assigned a role of either “advisor”
or “client”. The assigned role remains the same throughout the experiment.
The experiment consists of 8 rounds. In every round each advisor is matched
with a client. The matching is random in each round. The same pair of partici-
pants cannot be matched in more than one round.
In every round, the computer randomly chooses a “secret” number between
1 and 100 for each pair. Each number is equally likely to be chosen. Each pair
of participants has their own secret number.
At the beginning of the round, the number is shown to the advisor, but not to
the client.
After the advisor is informed about the number, he must send a message to
his client in the following form:
“The secret number is . . . ”
The advisor can transmit any number between 1 and 100, independently of
the actual number.
The client’s task is to guess the secret number after getting the message. The
payoffs to both players depend on whether the guess of the client is correct. In
every round, the computer randomly chooses one of the two following payment
options (the payoffs are in “game points”):
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Option X:
Advisor’s points Client’s points
The guess of the client is correct 10 10
The guess of the client is wrong 11 2
Option Y:
Advisor’s points Client’s points
The guess of the client is correct 7 10
The guess of the client is wrong 10 2
The advisor knows exactly which payment option, X or Y, has been chosen
by the computer in each round. The client knows only the probability of each
case. The probability, with which option X or Y is chosen in a given round, is
determined by the computer prior to the round and is shown to both the advisor
and the client. This probability is the same for all pairs of participants. The
choice of the probabilities is not affected by any participant and does not depend
on the decisions made in the previous rounds.
After the client submits his guess, each participant gets to know how many
points he and his co-player have earned in the round. The client is also informed
about the actual number which has been observed by the advisor and the actual
payment option (X or Y) which has been played.
At the beginning of the first two rounds you will be asked control questions.
By answering these questions you can earn additional money.
At the end of the whole experiment, the computer calculates your total pay-
off. The total payoff consists of the following: you get the payoff from two of
eight rounds, your earnings from correctly answering the control questions, and
an additional 2.50 Euro as a show-up fee. The rounds which are paid are chosen
randomly by the computer. The same rounds will be chosen for all participants.
For the payment, 2 game points correspond to 1 Euro.
The payment proceeds at the end of the experiment in cash, after signing a
receipt.
After the experiment is finished, you will be asked several questions about
your personality.
Please press the button “Ready”, after you have read and understood the in-
structions.
Control questions (beliefs elicitation)
For the client: We ask you to make a guess. How many of the [Number of
advisors in the session] advisors participating in the experiment will send the
correct secret number to their client in this round? If you guess correctly, you
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will receive an additional 5 Euro (independently of whether this round is chosen
for payment or not). You will be informed whether your guess is correct at the
end of the experiment.
For the advisor: We have asked your client to make the following guess:
“How many of the [Number of advisors in the session] advisors participating in
the experiment will send the correct secret number to their client in this round?”
We ask you to guess the answer of your client to this question. If you guess
correctly, you will receive an additional 5 Euro (independently of whether this
round is chosen for payment or not). You will be informed whether your guess
is correct at the end of the experiment.
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